There were improvements in Australian proficiency in land force projection, especially force rotation, in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Australian Government responded to a threat from Chinese-inspired communism by projecting small regular forces to participate in a US-led UN campaign in Korea and a British campaign in Malaya, and then Malaysia, to symbolise Australian resolve. However, there were persistent weaknesses in specific force preparation, deployment and sustainment of the first contingents to deploy. Land forces had to improvise and depend on circumstances, such as being given time after arrival and the goodwill of allies, to make up for these deficiencies before being committed to combat operations.

Australia expected allies to be the forward line of Australian homeland defence and to supplement the functions of force projection despite the experience of having to defend New Guinea in 1942 without substantial allied assistance. Little was done to develop autonomous logistic and higher-level communications capabilities, or to exercise joint command to enable independent projections like the AN and MEF projection in 1914. The Australian Government did not appear to expect self-reliant Australian joint force operations while British and American allies maintained a strong presence in Southeast Asia.

Indeed, Australia was still projecting land forces as it had in 1885, 1900, 1914, 1940 and 1942; and light infantry battalions supported by field artillery remained at its core. The change for the Cold War was that land forces were not comprised of rallying volunteers already possessing many of the skills and attributes of soldiers. A relatively small group of officers and men, who spent years in regimental service, maintained Australia’s capability and capacity for land force projection.

The projections of the first 20 years following the Second World War confirmed that the Australian people expected their armed forces to operate in the Southeast Asian archipelago and beyond to protect Australian interests and bolster alliance relationships. However, the British were about to withdraw east of the Suez. As a result, British grand strategy, cultural and racial ties, historical obligations or mutual self-interest would not prompt Australian military action. Australia would have to depend solely on American military power in Southeast Asia. This historic parting of the ways from the mother country was symbolised by the divergence of British and Australian policies over supporting the Americans in Vietnam.