Meanwhile, the maritime component of the combined force was coming on line. HMAS Tobruk berthed in Townsville on 28 September 1994. However, despite the efforts of the CO, Commander John Wells, and staff at Maritime Headquarters to seek guidance and advice, there was no information available from the army as to the logistic requirements. Logistic staff at both Land Headquarters and HQ Logistic Command did not appear to have briefed their naval counterparts at Maritime Headquarters on logistic requirements before HMAS Tobruk sailed from Sydney. In effect, the first orders Wells would receive, about the role his ship would play and its load, came from O’Hara in Townsville after Wells arrived. Loading now became a ‘hand to mouth’ activity reminiscent of the deployment of a battalion group to Somalia in 1993, some 10 months before.^[54] Over the next few days, stores accumulated on the Townsville wharf as the ship’s army staff developed a loading plan ‘on the run’ in conjunction with Hughes and his 3rd Brigade staff. In an early indication of the communications problems awaiting the operation, naval communications staff discovered that the portable Inmarsat telephone installed by Land Headquarters communications staff was not suited to being on a ship. The Inmarsat was normally ground-based and depended on a small dish (pointing up at the satellite in stationary orbit) being used to transmit the signal. The rolling of a ship and its movement through the water meant that the Inmarsat dish was not stable and able to keep its direction.^[55]

By the end of September there was still no news of whether Chan would postpone the start date of the conference. By this time, the South Pacific contingents had begun pre-deployment training and administration in Townsville.^[56] Staff at HQ ADF issued final ROE for Operation Lagoon the night before training began.^[57] Training in these ROE was going to be rushed even if the full 10-day period was allowed. Specific force preparation in Townsville was still predicated on the start date for the conference being postponed until 15 October. If Chan did not agree, there would be some difficulty completing sufficient training in time. There were also indications that the PNG Government had not allowed sufficient time to put basic infrastructure, such as accommodation, food preparation areas, sanitation services, electrical power and a clean water supply in place for the conference. Because there was no clear division of responsibility, the ADF might be left with the blame for providing insufficient logistic support and amenities to facilitate the conduct of the conference.