Lieutenant General John Sanderson, the Chief of the Army, called Colonel David Hurley into his office on 20 October 1997 to advise him to be prepared to accompany Mortlock and a small team of diplomats and military officers to PNG and Bougainville later in the month.[15] Presumably, Sanderson had anticipated deployment of Australian army personnel to Bougainville and had selected Hurley because he had been an adviser to the PNG Government for Operation Lagoon.
The next day, Mortlock and his chief of staff for the coming operation, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cassidy, met with New Zealand diplomats in Wellington.[16] They assessed that there was uneven support for a New Zealand-led regional monitoring operation in Bougainville among senior Australian Defence officers and officials in Canberra. The New Zealand diplomats concluded, however, that the expectations generated by the Burnham Truce and the obvious willingness of Howard and Downer to support New Zealand initiatives would overcome reservations in the Australian Department of Defence.[17]
After meetings in Canberra, Mortlock led a Resource Group, comprised of Australian and New Zealand diplomats and military officers, to PNG to assess expectations for a truce monitoring group.[18] On 28 October, Major General Jim Connolly warned his component commanders and their staffs not to conduct any planning because it was premature to develop options for ADF involvement in Bougainville before the receipt of strategic guidance from Canberra.[19] Coincidentally, on the same day, Lieutenant Colonel Ashley Gunder, Hickling’s senior plans officer, issued a draft concept for operations[20] and force structure for a truce monitoring group supported by a 170-strong logistic support team to staff at Land Headquarters and Headquarters Logistic Support Force (HQ LSF), seeking their input.[21]
Staff at Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ), Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQ AST), the environmental headquarters (Maritime, Land, and Air), and Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) had been following developments in Bougainville with great interest in the media. More particularly, they monitored the progress of the Resource Group through Hurley’s daily reports that were distributed concurrently to each level of command. They waited impatiently for guidance and authority to take action. Colonel John Culleton, Colonel (Operations) at Land Headquarters, directed his staff to send out a situation report on Bougainville on 3 November 1997. This report was a thinly-disguised warning order. Culleton had assessed that it was easier to apologise than to ask permission.[22] It alerted DJFHQ and LSF that ADF logistic elements would most likely be deployed to Bougainville soon. Connolly sharply criticised Culleton for ‘jumping the gun’ through his Chief of Staff, Air Commodore Angus Houston.[23] The Strategic Watch Group met on 4 November and Land Headquarters staff acquired a copy of a warning order drafted by General John Baker’s staff later that evening.[24] Baker issued his warning order later that night, while Connolly issued his own warning order the following day (5 November 1997), which included ordering the immediate deployment of planning and liaison officers to New Zealand—a rush was on. Baker’s warning order foreshadowed ADF involvement in Bougainville, but it provided no guidance on the nature of ADF support or deployment timings. Despite this warning, Connolly continued to put contingency planning on hold for a truce monitoring group until further clarification arrived from Canberra.[25]
On 6 November 1997, the Resource Group recommended that a peacekeeping organisation, called the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), be established, comprising 85 monitors and 65 support troops not including helicopter support.[26] It was a very optimistic assessment of the number of support troops that would be required. Military staffs in Canberra and Sydney now waited expectantly for the outcomes of discussions between Baker and Birks. By this time, Hickling’s staff had assessed that a 170-strong logistic and communications support force, including a headquarters supplemented by intelligence capabilities, would be required to support about 85 monitors deployed in four teams around Bougainville, and that HMAS Tobruk was needed.[27]
[15] Lieutenant Colonel David J. Hurley in interview with author, 3 March 1998.
[16] Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Cassidy in interview with author, 8 February 1998. Cassidy was Mortlock’s senior NZDF staff officer and chief negotiator for Operation Bel Isi.
[17] Cassidy in interview with author, 8 February 1998.
[18] Resources Team comprised Brigadier Roger C. Mortlock, John Hayes, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, David Irvine, Australian Ambassador to PNG, Greg L. Moriarty, PNG Section, DFAT, Colonel David J. Hurley, Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Cassidy, Nigel Moore, New Zealand Embassy, PNG.
[19] Author’s note in his personal diary on 28 October 1997.
[20] concept for operations: A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called ‘commander’s concept’ or CONOPS (DOD).
[21] Lieutenant Colonel Ashley L. Gunder, ‘CONOPS—Truce Monitoring Group (Bougainville)’, email, 28 October 1997. Copy held by author.
[22] Author’s note in personal diary, 3 November 1997.
[23] Author’s note in personal diary, 3 November 1997. Colonel John J. Culleton in discussions with the author during this period. In early November 1997, the author attended all the meetings related to the deployment to Bougainville convened in Land Headquarter.
[24] Note in author’s diary, 4 November 1997.
[25] Note in author’s diary, 4 November 1997.
[26] Resource Group Report on a Proposed Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville, undated, but covered by a facsimile sheet signed by Hurley on 6 November 1997. Copy held by author.
[27] Gunder in discussions with author in early November 1997. Gunder was Staff Officer Grade 1 (Joint Plans) at Land Headquarters. He chaired the Bougainville Watch Group and coordinated contingency planning. He had been receiving copies of Hurley’s daily progress reports from the Resource Group.