An alternate hypothesis is to link strategic guidance with deficiencies in force projection, and play down 100 years of conditioning and inter-Service rivalry. Though it is not the purpose of this monograph to explore strategic level decision-making and policy development, an examination of the Defence of Australia 1987 does not reveal a direct link. The architect of that White Paper, Paul Dibb, correctly assessed that ‘Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world’ and faces ‘no identifiable military threat’.^[16] However, he did not advocate continental defence or isolationism. The White Paper left all three Services with generic capabilities for force projection.

In respect to land forces, it specified that ‘more emphasis will be given to highly mobile forces capable of rapid deployment’.^[17] Dibb saw Australia’s geography as both a boon and a ‘daunting task’ for force projection.^[18] Remoteness from centres of global conflict and the sea and air gap around the continent, as well as self-sufficiency in basic commodities, were blessings for Australian defence because they posed significant force projection challenges for enemies.^[19] However, the ‘daunting task’ for the ADF would be self-reliant defence of Australian territorial sovereignty. Dibb envisioned Australia having to project military force over thousands of kilometres from the southern and eastern heartlands to the western and northern hinterlands.^[20] To achieve this, he recommended an emphasis on projecting maritime and air power with support from ground forces able to operate over ‘vast distances’—within continental Australia—to defeat ‘raiding groups’.^[21] While the Defence of Australia 1987 assessed that the primary purpose of land force projection would be national, there were sufficient land force capabilities to enable both regional and international projection. Dibb recognised that logistics would underwrite force projection. He recommended pre-positioning both combat forces and ‘integral ADF logistic capacities within operational areas in the north’.^[22] He also identified the need for ‘sustained exercises in the north, supported by bases in the south, to test and identify weaknesses in our logistic train’.^[23]