Urban water-law reform, in concert with broader trends, is premised upon a move away from traditional statutory-authority models of water provision and regulation. Primarily, the changes constitute a move from monolithic public-authority models towards the creation of semi-autonomous water ‘production’ and distribution entities and ‘separate’ regulatory institutions. These entities are to function in a market economy; albeit in which the state retains significant control over the functioning of the market. In some instances, the state may constitute itself as an indirect ‘player’ in the market through shareholding in water utilities. Increasingly also, in the urban context, the normative order regulating water increasingly incorporates not only formal laws but a plethora of less-formal standard-setting, behavioural-change models and the development of monitoring and compliance processes, all administered and enforced by a mixture of public authorities, independent agencies such as price regulators, and private ‘consumers.’ (Parker et al. 2004: 1). Regulators operate increasingly in a pluralistic setting where certain state functions are shared with, or devolved to, private interests (Keohane et al. 1998: 314). Thus, while market-based economic ‘theory’ and its assumption of deregulation have been highly influential as an impetus for recent water-law reform in Australia, regulation of urban water presents a more complex picture. Externally-defined purposes set by agencies such as the National Water Commission (which administers the NWI) are incorporated into the structural shift from predominantly statutory-based water authorities to a situation of water ‘suppliers’, ‘consumers’ and, potentially, an expansive market system of water trading.